Over a century ago, Henry David Thoreau wrote the famous work “Civil Disobedience,”
in which he expounded his views on obedience to authority. Simply
stated, the essay holds that each citizen has the moral and ethical
obligation to disobey civil authorities if he perceives that any laws
and/or dictates set forth by the government are unjust or immoral.
Thoreau
was an idealistic man, imbued with a profound sense of conscience and
social responsibility, and his position derives a measure of support
from the fact that Thoreau himself spent a night in jail for refusing to
pay his poll tax on grounds that the right to vote should not be a
taxable “commodity.” Henry David Thoreau appears to have been a man who
practiced what he preached.
Today,
Thoreau is required reading in many American Literature courses.
Presumably, certain elements within the American educational
establishment believe that Thoreau’s ideas may be useful towards instilling a
sense of ethics into its students, thus creating the morally refined
citizens of tomorrow – citizens who are continually questioning and
evaluating their government. Such a person is thought by many to be the
‘ideal citizen’ – the perfect expression of Democracy at work.
This
sounds good on paper, but is it a realistic viewpoint? Can we really
expect the “average” citizen to defer to conscience and morality if the
heavy hand of government – a government turned malevolent - should come
to rest upon him?
Consider
the work of two prominent research psychologists – the late Dr. Stanely
Milgram of Yale University and Dr. Irving Janis, also of Yale. Both
men were concerned with studying the phenomenon of obedience to
authority. What they discovered stands in stark contrast to the
idealism of Thoreau. To summarize their basic conclusions, both have
found that ordinary people will readily abandon their sense of moral and
ethical responsibility when a superior authority, or authorities,
requires them to do so. Dr. Milgram found that such authority need only
be vested in a single authority figure; Janis’ work suggests that
authority may also be vested in a cohesive group of individuals, where
peer pressure comes to bear. Despite the subtle differences in their
ideas, both men have shed light on the same disturbing phenomenon –
obedience to authority even when compliance conflicts with common moral
values.
Dr.
Milgram derived his results on the phenomenon of “hyper-obedience” by
designing a series of controlled experiments for testing a paid
volunteer’s willingness to administer a painful shock to another subject
when ordered to do so by an authority figure (in this case, the
experimenter). In the original experiment, documented in Milgram’s “The Perils Of Obedience,”
Dr. Milgram solicited volunteers from the mass of students at Yale,
ostensibly to participate in a study on learning and punishment. Two
volunteers at a time came into Milgram’s laboratory. One volunteer was
given the role of “teacher,” and his job was to administer an electric
shock, in steadily increasing voltages with each failure of the learner
to respond correctly. The shocks ranged from 10-450 volts.
Unbeknownst
to the teacher, the student strapped in the “electric chair” was a
counterfeit – a paid actor. He was instructed to act out his part quite
convincingly, screaming horribly as the voltage increased, pleading for
the termination of the experiment. In reality, no shock was being
administered. But the test was established. How far would the teacher
go, at the prodding of the experimenter?*
In
the essay, Milgram recounts how he sought predictions about the outcome
of the experiment before undertaking it. Among the psychiatrists that
he surveyed, the predictions largely favored “man the moral entity” –
the majority of the psychiatrists predicted that most subjects would
refuse to obey the commands of the experimenter.
So
Milgram put his colleagues’ predictions to test, discovering, much to
his surprise, that the predictions were wrong. In the first
experiments, nearly sixty percent of the subjects “…obeyed the orders of
the experimenter to the end, punishing the victim until they reached
the most potent shock available on the generator.”
Needless
to say, these results were quite “shocking” to both Milgram and his
colleagues. The experiment was repeated in different settings and
persons from differing social strata were drawn as volunteers.
But the disturbing results did not go away. As Milgram stated: ”…the
experiment’s total outcome was the same as we had observed among the
students.”
This,
then, is the essence of Milgram’s work. It is very similar, as stated
previously, to the ideas of Dr. Janis on the phenomenon of groupthink,
which Janis has outlined in his essay entitled, “Groupthink:
psychological studies of policy decisions and fiascoes.” In Janis’ own
words groupthink constitutes
“…social
pressures that develop in cohesive groups: in infantry platoons, air
crews, therapy groups, seminars, and self study or encounter groups.
Members tend to evolve informal objectives to preserve friendly
intra-group relations, and this becomes part of the hidden agenda at
their meetings.”
Janis
cites a few historic events where groupthink may have played a
considerable role in the disastrous outcomes – disasters such as Pearl
Harbor and the Bay of Pigs fiasco. I have chosen another example that
provides an excellent illustration of the groupthink phenomenon in
action: the top-level meeting held at NASA headquarters on the eve of
the space shuttle Challenger’s ill-fated flight in 1986.
At
that meeting, Dr. Allen McDonald, along with several other
Morton-Thiokol engineers, voiced strong objections to the proposed
launch because of concerns over an approaching mass of Arctic air.
These objections were summarily overruled when a NASA manager
exclaimed: “My God, Thiokol, when do you want me to launch? Next
April?” Regarding that comment, the March 3, 1986 issue of Newsweek stated
“As Allen Mc Donald told it, that exasperated protest from NASA was the
key moment. Under the gun, the managers of Morton-Thiokol Inc.
overruled their engineers and signed approval for the Challenger to
blast off.”
Janis
stated, as one of the criterion for groupthink in the Bay of Pigs
fiasco, that “selective bias was shown in the way the members reacted to
information and judgments from experts…they were only interested in
facts and opinions that supported their preferred policy.” In the case
of the Challenger meeting, the NASA managers’ “preferred policy” was to
launch the Space Shuttle on the following morning at 11:30 A.M. Eastern
Standard Time. Dissenting opinions were at odds with this policy, and
so the “upstarts” were brought into line through group pressure, and
induced to sign off on the launch, despite strong objections (which
later proved to be valid).
Thus
we can see that this succumbing to group pressure, this “groupthink,”
is not merely a esoteric theory for philosophic debate, but is, rather, a
very real phenomenon with often disastrous results. And
hyper-obedience seems to have its truest expression wherever the
superior/subordinate relationship is very clear-cut. The NASA managers,
on their own turf at the Kennedy Space Center, clearly had the
upper-hand over the Morton-Thiokol engineers, who were only employees of
one of NASA’s many contractors. Likewise, in Milgram’s experiments,
the teacher is clearly subordinate to the authority of the experimenter.
The experimenter is a PhD affiliated with a major university, and the
teacher is merely a volunteer being paid a modest sum for his time.
Finally, in Janis’ theory, the individual is clearly subordinate to the
authority of the group at large. One opinion is hard pressed to
prevail against ten dissenting ones.
Milgram
may give us some insight into this potent superior/subordinate
relationship when he says, in regard to the teacher’s role in his
experiment: “To extricate himself from his plight, the subject must
make a clear break with authority.” In Milgram’s experiment this would
translate into the adamant, even angry, refusal to continue shocking the
learner. Likewise, in Janis’ scenario, the “deviant” would have to
refuse to back down, despite the disdain of the group at large. Only in
this way would it be possible to alter the directive of the group, or
at least free oneself from the burden of responsibility by withdrawing
support from the group’s decisions.
Of
all the rigid superior/subordinate relationships, none are more
well-established than those in the nation’s military. The nation’s
armed forces are founded on hyper-obedience. When an enlisted man is
given an order by a superior officer, it is generally accepted that he must
obey. It is only reasonable, then, to expect the problems outlined by
Milgram and Janis to manifest in a military situation.** Indeed, the
massacre at My Lai, Vietnam, in which one Lt. Calley directed the
murders of Vietnamese civilians, is a profound example of the power of
hyper-obedience.
As Stanley Resor’s official report
on the massacre documents, the entire company of soldiers under Lt.
Calley acted pursuant to his orders, unquestionably gunning down the
men, women and children of My Lai Hamlet. Milgram’s essay “Obedience in Vietnam”
includes a CBS interview of one of the My Lai participants, conducted
by Mike Wallace, in which the soldier recounts the following gruesome
aspect of the massacre: “He said (Lt. Calley), “I want them dead.”…so I
started shooting…I poured about four clips into the group.”
Various
other aspects of the massacre are recounted in similarly gruesome
detail – it’s not essential to cover them all. But one significant quote
from the soldier cannot be omitted because it concerns the
rationalizations of the soldier in regard to his immoral actions: “Why
did I do it? Because I felt like I was ordered to do it….”
This
rationalization was commonly invoked by the teachers in Milgram’s
study. The volunteers tried to free themselves from guilt by stating
that they had only done what was required of them – they were simply
following instructions. Indeed, one teacher who was tottering on the
edge of disobedience was reassured when the experimenter claimed
complete responsibility, and obediently proceeded to shock the learner
repeatedly at 450 volts.
For
some reason, many humans have the capacity to psychologically disengage
themselves from a sense of responsibility when committing an immoral
act, as long as they are acting pursuant to the orders of an authority
figure. As Milgram states in “Obedience in Vietnam”:
“A substantial proportion of people do what they are told to do, irrespective of the content of the act and without limitations of conscience, so long as they perceive that the command comes from a legitimate authority.”
Adolf
Eichmann, who engineered the mass-exterminations of millions of
innocents in Germany, is another example that Milgram invokes in
“Perils.” When on trial in Israel for his war crimes, he repeatedly
claimed that he had only been carrying out orders.
But
like all others who invoke this rationalization, Eichmann was guilty.
The key point that these individuals overlook is that that the option
of disobedience does exist. Granted, in Eichmann’s case the result of
such disobedience would have probably been an appointment with the
firing squad. But the subjects in Milgram’s experiment faced no such
life-or-death imperative – they simply administered the shocks in an
effort to be polite and cooperative with the experimenter. Milgram has
considered this strange displacement of morality in “Perils”:
“What is extraordinary is his apparent total indifference to the
learner; he hardly takes cognizance of him as a human being. Meanwhile,
he relates to the experimenter in a submissive and courteous
fashion….Morality does not disappear – it acquires a radically different
focus: the subordinate person feels shame or pride depending on how
adequately he has performed the actions called for by authority.”
Similarly,
in Janis’ theory, the deviant succumbs to the will of the group often
just to “…preserve friendly intra-group relations….” Again, the odd
displacement of morality is obvious.
In
the case of the My-Lai Massacre, I submit that both Milgram’s and
Janis’ versions of hyper-obedience played important roles. While
engaging in unquestioning obedience to a single authority figure, the
soldiers were also acting as part of a highly cohesive group. For any
single soldier to disobey orders would have constituted a break with the
group as well as Lt. Calley.
Hyper-obedience
is an intriguing but terrifying phenomenon. It suggests that seemingly
moral persons have the built in capacity to commit truly vile acts
under certain circumstances. In “Obedience in Vietnam” Milgram
concludes:
“The results…raise the possibility that human nature, or – more
specifically – the kind of character produced is American Democratic
society, cannot be counted on to insulate its citizens from brutality
and inhuman treatment at the direction of malevolent authority….”
Enter the automaton.
-------
*Milgram
was severely criticized by many of his colleagues, among others, on
grounds that his experiments were unethical, with potential for causing
psychological harm to the volunteers. The author agrees with these
criticisms, and the discussion of Milgram’s work in this essay should
not be taken as tacit approval of same.
**In
the context of military law, there are situations where a subordinate
may rightfully disobey a direct order from one’s superior; however,
taking the overall nature of war into account along with the harsh
realities of the battlefield, the line between “moral and immoral” is a
complex issue. For a good, brief discussion on this subject see this article.
